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Irreversible investment is especially sensitive to such risk fac-
tors as volatile exchange  rates and uncertainty about tariff
structures and future cash flows. If the goal of macroeconomic
policy is to stimulate investment,  stability  and credibility may be
more important than tax incentives or interest rates.
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Most major investment expenditures are at least  Trtde  reform, when suspected to be only
partly irreversible: the finn cannot disinvest, so  temporary, can also be counterproductive,  with
the expenditures are sunk costs.  aggregate investment declining because of liber-
alization.  Uncertainty about future tariff struc-
Irreversibility has important implications for  tures, and hence over future factor retums,
investment decisions - and for the factors most  creates an opportunity cost kor  committing
likely to affect investment spending.  capital to new physical plant.  Foreign exchange
and liquid assets held abroad involve no such
Irreversible investment is especially sensi-  commitment, and so may be preferable even
tive to such risk factors as uncertainty about  though the expected rate of return is lower.
future cash flows, interest rates, and the cost and
timing of investments.  Likewise, it may be difficult to stem or
reverse capital flight if the perception is that it
Pindyck reviews some simple models of  may become more difficult to take capital -,ut  of
irreversible investment - to explain how  the country than to bring it in.
optimal investment rules can be obtained from
contingent claim analysis or from dynamic  Investments in the energy field may be
programming.  influenced by the threat of price controls,
windfall profit taxes, or related policies that
He also discusses how to model investment  might be imposed should prices rise substan-
when irreversibility is important, so one can  tially.
understand the likely response of investment
spending to policy incentives and other changes  Policies that stabilize prices may influence
in the environment.  investment decisions in markets for commodities
(such as oil) for which prices are often volatile.
To the extent that the goal of macroecon-
omic policy is to stimulate investment, for  Increases in the volatility of interest or
example, stability and credibility may be more  exchange rates depress investment - but it is
important than tax incentives or interest rates.  not clear how much.  Determining the impor-
As a determinant of aggregate investment  tanee of these factors - through empirical
spending, the level of interest rates may be less  studies and simulation models - should be a
important than their volatility (and the volatility  research priority.
of other variables).
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1.  Introduction.
Despite  its importance  to economic  growth  and the  evolution  of market
structure,  the  investment  behavior of firms, industries,  and countries
remains  poorly  understood. Econometric  models  have  been  notorious  in their
failure to  explain and  predict changes in  investment spending, and
economists  nave  been  unable  to  provide  a clear  and  convincing  explanation  of
why it is that some countries  or industries  invest  more than others.  We
also lack  answers  to normative  questions. It is difficult,  for  example,  to
design  tax  policies  when the  dependence  of investment  on tax rates  is not
known. And  business  school  students  are  often  mislead  when they  are  told  to
base investment  decisions  on a simple  net  present  value  rule.
Part of the  problem  may  be that  mozt econometric  models  of investment
behavior  are based  on the implicit  assumption  that investment  expenditures
are reversible,  i.e.,  can be "undone." So,  too, is the  net present  value
rule as it is usually  taught  to students  in  business  school: "Invest  in a.
project  when the present  value of its  expected  cash flows  is at least  at
large as its cost."  This rule is incorrect  if the investment  is not
reversible  and the  decision  to invest  can  be postponed.
Most major investment  expenditures  have two important  characteristics
which  together  can  dramatically  affect  the  decision  to invest. First,  the
expenditures  are largely  irreversible;  the firm cannot  disinvest,  so the
expenditures  must be viewed  as sunk  costs.  Second,  most  major  investments
can be delayed,  giving  the firm  an opportunity  to  wait for  new information
to  arrive  about  prices,  costs,  and  other  market  conditions  before  it  commits
resources.- 2 -
Irreversibility  usually arises  because capital is industry  or firm
specific,  i.e.,  it  cannot  be used  productively  in  a different  industry  or by
a different  firm. A steel  plant,  for  example,  is industry  specific. It can
only  be used to  produce  steel,  so if the  demand  for  steel  falls,  the  market
value  of the  plant  will fall.  Although  the  plant  could  be sold to another
steel company,  there is likely  to be little gain from doing so, so the
investment  in the  plant  must  be viewed  as a sunk  cost. As another  example,
most investments  in marketing  and  advertising  are firm  specific,  and so are
likewise  sunk costs.  Partial irreversibility  can also result from the
"lemons"  problem.  Office  equipment,  cars, trucks,  and computers  are not
industry  specific,  but have resale  value well below their  purchase  cost,
even  if  new.
Irreversibility  can also arise  because of government  regulations  or
institutional  arrangements.  For example,  capital controls  may make it
impossible  for  foreign  (or  domestic)  investors  to  sell  assets  and  reallocate
their funds.  Or, investments  in new workers  may be partly  irreversible
because  of high  costs  of  hiring  and  firing. 1
As an emerging  literature  has  demonstrated,  and  as  will  be explained  in
this  paper,  irreversibility  undermines tl.s theoretical  foundation of
standard  neoclassical  investment  models,  and also invalidates  the  NPV rule
as it is commonly  tauight  in business  schools.  Irreversibility  also has
important implications  for the factors that are most likely to affect
investment  spending.  Irreversible  investment  is especially  sensitive  to
risk factors;  for  example,  uncertainties  over the  future  product  prices  and
1I  will focus  mostly  on investment  in  capital  equipment,  but the  issues
that I will discuss  also arise  in labor  markets,  as Dornbusch  (1987)  has
pointed  out.  For  a model  of how  hiring  and firing  costs  affect  employment,
see  Bentolila  and  Bertola  (1988).operating  costs  that  determine  cash flows,  uncertainty  over future  interest
rates,  and uncertainty  over the cost and timing  of the  in-estment  itself.
In the context  of macroeconomic  policy,  this  means that if the goal is to
stimulate  investment,  stability  and credibility  may be much more important
than  tax  incentives  or interest  rates.
An irreversible  investment  opportunity  is akin to a financial  call
option. A call  option  gives  the  holder  the  right  (for  some  specified  amount
of time)  to pay an exercise  price  and in return  receive  an asset (e.g.,  a
share  of stock)  that  has some  value. A firm  with  an investment  opportunity
has the option  to spend  money (the  "exercise  price")  now or in the  future,
in return for an asset (e.g., a project) of some value.  As with a
financial  call option, the firm's  option  to invest is valuable in part
because  the future  value of the asset  that the firm gets by investing  is
uncertain.  If the asset rises  in value,  the  payoff  from investing  rises.
If it falls  in value,  the  firm  need  not invest,  and  will  only lose  what it
spent  to  obtain  the  investment  opportunity.
How do firms obtain  investment  opportunities? Sometimes  they result
from patents,  or ownership  of land  or natural  resources. More generally,
they arise from a firm's  managerial  resources,  technological  knowledge,
reputation,  market  position,  and  possible  scale,  all  of which  may  have  been
built up over time, and which enable  the firm to productively  undertake
investments  that individuals  or  other  firms cannot undertake.  Most
important,  these  options  to invest  are  valuable. Indeed,  for  most  firms,  a
substantial  part of their  market  value  is attributable  to their  options  toinvest  and grow in the future,  as opposed  to the  capital  that  they  already
have in  place. 2
When  a firm  makes  an irreversible  investment  expenditure.,  it  exercises,
or "kills,"  its option  to invest. It gives  up the  possibility  of waiting
for  new information  ta arrive  that  might  affect  the  desirability  or timing
of the expenditure;  it cannot disinvest  should  market conditions  change
adversely. This lost option  value  must  be included  as part of the  cost of
the investment.  As a result,  the  NPV rule "Invest  when the  value  of a unit
of capital  is  at least  as large  as the  purchase  and  installation  cost  of the
unit" is not valid.  The value of the unit must exceed  the  purchase  and
installation  cost,  by an amount  equal  to the  value  of keeping  the  option  to
invest  these  resources  elsewhere  alive  --  an opportunity  cost  of investing.
Recent  studies  have shown  that  this  opportunity  cost can  be large,  and
investment  rules that ignore it can be grossly in error. 3 Also, this
opportunity  cost is  highly  sensitive  to  uncertainty  over  the  future  value  of
the  project,  so that  changing  economic  conditions  that  affect  the  perceived
riskiness of  future cash flows can have a  large impact on  investment
spending,  larger  than,  say, a change  in interest  rates.  This may explain
why neoclassical  investment  theory  has failed  to provide good empirical
models  of investment  behavior.
2The  importance  of  growth options as a  source of  firm value is
discussed  in  Myers  (1977). Also,  see  Kester  (1984)  and  Pindyck  (1988).
3See, for example,  McDonald  and Siegel  (1986),  Brennan  and Schwartz
(1985),  Majd and Pindyck (1987),  and Pindyce.  (1988). Bernanke  (1983)  and
Cukierman (1980)  have developed  related models in which firms have an
incentive  to  postpone  irreversible  investments  so that  they  can  wait for  new
information  to  arrive. However,  in  their  models,  this  information  makes  the
future  value  of an investment  less  uncertain;  we  will focus  on situations  in
which  information  arrives  over  time,  but the  future  is always  uncertain.This paper has several  objectives.  First,  I will review  some basic
models  of  irreversible  investment to  illustrate  the  option-like
characteristics  of  investment  opportuniUles,  and  to  show how  optimal
investment  rules can be  obtained from methods of  option pricing, or
alternatively  from  dynamic  programming.  Besides  demonstrating  a methodology
that  can  be used to solve  investment  problems,  this  will serve  to show  how
the resulting  investment  rules  depend  on various  parameters  that come from
the  market  environment.
Second, I will discuss the implications  of irreversibility  for the
empirical  analysis  of investment  behavior. At issue  is  how  we can  best go
about  modelling  investment  when  irreversibility  is important,  so that  we can
better understand  the likely response  of  investment  spending  to policy
incentives  and  other  changes  in  the  macroeconomic  environment.
Finally,  I will briefly discuss some of the implications  that the
irreversibility  of investment  may have for policy.  For example,  policies
that  stabilize  prices  or  exchange  rates  may  be effective  ways  of stimulating
investment. Similarly,  a major  cost  of political  and  economic  instability
may  be  its  depressing  effect on  investment.  This is  likely to be
particularly  important for the developing  economies.  For many LDC's,
investment  as a fraction  of GDP  has fallen  dramatically  during  the 1980's,
despite  moderate  economic  growth. Yet the  success  of macroeconomic  policy
in these countries  requires  increases  in private investment.  This has
created  a Catch-22  that makes the social  value of investment  higher than
its  private  value. The reason  is that if firms  do not  have  confidence  that
macro  policies  will succeed  and  growth  trajectories  will  be maintained,  they
are afraid  to invest,  but if they  do not invest,  macro  policies  are indeed
doomed to fail.  It is therefore  important  to understand  how investment6-
might depend on risk factors that are at least partly  under government
control,  e.g.,  price,  wage,  and  exchange  rate  stability,  the  threat  of price
controls  or expropriation,  and  changes  in trade  regimes.
The next section  uses a simple  two-period  example  to illustrate  how
irreversibility  can affect  an investment  decision,  and how option  pricing
methods  can  be used  to value  a firm's  investment  opportunity,  and  determine
whether  or  not the  firm  should  invest.
Section  3 works through  a basic  continuous  time  model  of irreversible
investment  that  was first  examined  by McDonald  and Siegel  (1986). Here a
firm  must decide  when to in:est  in a project  whose  value follows  a random
walk.  We first  solve  this  problem  using  option  pricing  methods  and  then  by
dynamic  programming,  and  show  how  the  two  approaches  are  related. Section  4
extends  this  model  so that the  price  of the firm's  output  follows  a random
walk, and the firm can (temporarily)  stop producing  If price  falls  below
variable  cost. We will  show  how  both  the  value  of the  project  and  the  value
of the  firm's  option  to invest  in the  project  can  be determined,  and  derive
the  optimal  investment  rule  and  examine  its  properties.
Section 5 discusses some of the empirical  issues that arise when
investment  is irreversible. We will argue  that traditional  approaches  to
modelling aggregate investmeng  spending  are unlikely to be successful,
briefly  discuss  some  tests  that  might  be  carried  out  to  determine  the
importarce  of  irreversibility.  Finally,  Section  6  discusses  policy
implications,  and  suggests  future  research.
2.  A Simole  Two-Period  Example.
The implications  of irreversibility  and the option-like  nature  of an
investment  opportunity  can be demonstrated  most easily  with a simple  two--7-
period example.  Consider  a firm's  decision  to irreversibly  invest  in a
widget  factory.  The factory  can  be built instantly,  at a cost I, and  will
produce  one widget  per year forever,  with zero operating  cost.  Currently
the price  of widgets is $100,  but next year the price  will change. With
probability  q, it will rise to $150,  and with probability  (l-q)  it will
fall to $50.  The price  will then remain  at  this  new level  forever.  (See
Figure  1.)  We will assume  that  this  risk is fully  diversifiable,  so that
the firm can discount  future  cash  flows  using the  risk-free  rate,  which  we
will take  to  be 10 pere:ent.
For the time  being w..  will set I - $800  and q - .5.  Is this a good
investment? Should  we  .nvest  now, or wait one year and see whether  the
price  goes  up or down?  Suppose  we invest  now.  Calculating  the  net  present
va'ue  of this  investmeit  in the  standard  way,  we get:
NPV  - - 800  +  . 1 0 0/( 1 . 1)t  - -800  +  1,100  - Q300
t-)
The NPV is positive;  the current  value  of a widget  factory  is  V0 - 1,100  >
800. Hence  it  would  teem  that  we should  go ahead  with the  investment.
This conclusion  ia'  incorrect,  however,  because  the  calculations  above
ignore  a cost - the  oppLrtunity  cost  of investing  now, rather  than  waiting
and thereby  keeping  open rhe  possibility  of not investing  should  the  price
fall.  To  see this, calculate  the NPV of this investment  opportunity,
assuming  we  wait one  year  a.-'  '-  '  - e-t the  price  goes  up:
NPV  - (.5)[-800/1.1  +  z  150/(1.1)t]  - 425/1.1  - S386
t-1
(Note  that in year 0, there  is  no expenditure  and no revenue.  In year 1,
the 800 is spent  only if the price rises  to $150,  which will  happen  withprobability  .5.)  The NPV today  is higher  if we plan to wait a year, so
clearly  waiting  is  better  than  investing  now.
Note that if our  only  choices  were to invest  today  or  never  invest,  we
would invest  today.  In that case there is no option  to wait a year,  and
hence no opportunity  cost to killing  such an option,  so the standard  NPV
rule  would apply.  Two things  are  needed  to introduce  an opportunity  cost
into  the  NPV  calculation  - irreversibility,  and  the  ability  to invest  in the
future as  an alternative  to investing  today.  There are, of!  course,
situations  in  which  a firm  innot  wait,  or cannot  wait  very long,  co  invest.
(One  example  is the  anticipated  entry  of a competitor  into  a  market  that  is
only large enough  for one firm.  Another  example is a patent  or mineral
resource  lease  that is about  to expire.) The less time  there  is to delay,
and the  greater  the cost  of delaying,  the  less  will irreversibility  affect
the investment  decision. We will develeo  this  point  again  in Section  3 in
the  context  of a more  general  model.
How much is it worth to have the flexibility  to make the investment
decision  next year,  rather  than  having  to invest  either  now or rnever?  (We
know that  having  this  flexibility  is of some  value,  because  we would  prefer
to  wait rather  than  invest  now.)  The  value  of this  "flexibility  option"  is
easy to calculate;  it is just the  difference  between  the two  NPV's,  i.e.,
$386 - $300 - $86.
Finally,  suppose  there  exists  a futures  market  for widgets,  with the
futures  price for delivery  one year from  now equal  to the  expected  future
spot  price,  i.e.,  $100.4  Would the  ability  to hedge  on the  futures  market
4In this example,  the futures  price  would equal the expected  future
price because we assumed  that the risk is fully  diversifiable. (If the
price  of widgets  were positively  correlated  with the  market  portfolio,  the
(continued...)-9
change  our investment  decision? Specifically,  would it lead  us to invest
now,  rather  than  waiting  a y,.sr?  The answer  is no.  To see  this,  note that
if we were to invest  now, we would hedge  by selling  short futures  for 5
wiugets; this would exactly offset any fluctuations  in the NPV of our
project  next year.  But this  would also mean rhat the NPV of our  project
today  is $300,  exactly  what it is  without  hedging. Hence  there  is  no gain
from hedging (the risk is diversifiable),  and we are still better off
waiting  until  next  year to  make  our  investment  decision.
Analogy  to Financial  ORtions.
Our investment  opportunity  is analogous  to a call option  on a common
stock.  It gives us the right (which  we need not exercise)  to make an
investment  expenditure  (the exercise  price of the option) and receive a
project  (a  share  of stock)  the  value  of  which  fluctuates  stochastically.  In
the case of our simple  example,  next year if the  price rises to $150,  we
exercise  our  option  by paying  $800  and  receive  an asset  which  will  be 'iorth
V1 - $1650 (-  ElSO/l.lt).  If the  price  falls  to $50, this asset  will  be
worth  only $550,  and  so  we will  not  exercise  the  option. We found  that  the
value of our investment  opportunity  (assuming  that the actual  decision  to
invest  can indeed  be made next year) is $386.  It will be helpful to
recalculate  this  value  using  option  pricing  methods,  because  later  we will
use  such  methods  to  analyze  other  investment  problems.
4(...continued)
futures  price  would  be less  than  the  expected  future  spot  price.) Note  that
if widgets  were storable  and aggregate  storage  is positive,  the marginal
convenience  yield from holding inventory  would then be 10 percent.  The
reason  is that since  the futures  price  equals  the  current  spot  price,  the
net  holding cost  (the interest  cost of  10 percent less the marginal
convenience  yield)  must  be zero.- 10  -
To  do  this,  let  Fo  denote the  value  today of  the  investment
opportunity,  i.e.,  what  we should  be  willing  to  pay  today  to  have the  option
to invest  in the widget  factory,  and let F1 denote  its value  next year.
Note that  F1 is a random  variable;  it depends  on what  happens  to the  price
of widgets.  It the price rises  to $150,  then F1 - 4150/(l.l)t  - 800 -
$850.  If the  price  falls  to $50,  the  option  to invest  will  go  unexercised,
so that  F1 - 0.  Thus  we  know all  possible  values  for  F1. The  problem  is to
find  Fo,  the  value  of  the  option  today.
To  solve this problem, we will create a  portfolio that has  two
components:  the  investment  opportunity  Itself,  and a  certain  number of
widgets. We will  pick  this  number  of  widgets  so that  the  portfolio  is  risk-
free,  i.e.,  so that its  value  next  year is independent  of  whether  the  price
of widgets  goes  up or down.  Since  the  portfolio  will  be risk-free,  we know
that the  rate of return  one can  earn  from  holding  it  must be the  risk-free
rate.  By setting  the  portfolio's  return  equal  to  that  rate,  we will  be able
to  calculate  the  current  value  of the  investment  opportunity.
Specifically,  consider  a portfolio  in which one holds the investment
opportunity,  and sells  short  n widgets.5 The  value  of this  portfolio  today
is to - Fo - nP0 - Fo - lOOn.  The value next year,  1  - F1 - nPj, depends
on Pi.  If P-  150  so that  F1 - 850, l - 850 - 150n.  If P1 - 50 so that
F1 - 0, 1  - 50n.  Now, let us choose  n so that  the  portfolio  is risk-
free,  i.e.,  so that  01 is independent  of  what  happens  to  price. To do this,
just  set:
850 - 150n - - 50n,
5If widgets were a  traded  commodity  (like  oil), one could obtain  a
short  position  by borrowing  from  another  producer,  or by going  short  in  the
futures  market. For the  moment,  however,  we need  not  be concerned  with  the
actual  implementation  of this  portfolio.- 11  -
or,  n  - 8.5.  With  n chosen  this  way,  l  - - 425,  whether  the  price  goes  up
or down.
We now calculate  the return  from  holding  this  portfolio. That return
is the capital  gain,  *1 - o, minus  any  payments  that  must  be made to hold
the  short  position. Since  the  expected  rate  of capital  gain  on a  widget  is
zero (the  expected  price  next  year is $100,  the  same  as this  year's  price),
no rational  investor  would hold a long position  unless  he or she could
expect to earn at least 10 percent.  Hence selling  widgets short will
require  a payment  of .lPO  - $10  per  widget  per  year. 6 Our  portfolio  has a
short  position  of 8.5  widgets,  so it will  have to pay out a total  of $85.
The return  from  holding  this  portfolio  over  the  year is thus  *1 - 0  - 85  -
1  - (Fo - nPO) - 85  - - 425 - Fo +  850 - 85 - 340 - Fo.
Because  this  return  is risk-free,  we know  that it  must  equal  the  risk-
free  rate,  which  we have assumed  is 10  percent,  times  the initial  value  of
the  portfolio,  *o  - Fo - nP 0:
340 - Fo - .l(FO  - 850),
We can  thus  determine  that  $.3.  Note  that  this  is  the  same  value  that
we obtained  before  by calculating  the NPV of the investment  opportunity
under  the assumption  that  we follow  the  optimal  strategy  of waiting  a year
befoie  deciding  whether  to  invest.
We have found  that the  value  of our investment  opportunity,  i.e.,  the
value  of the option  to invest  in this  project,  is $386.  The payoff  from
investing  (exercising  the  option)  today  is  $1100  - $800  - $300. But  once  we
invest,  our  option  is  gone,  so the  $386  is  an opportunity  cost  of investing.
6This is  analogous  to  selling  short  a dividend-paying  stock. The short
position  requires  payment  of the  dividend,  because  no rational  investor  will
hold the  offsetting  long  position  without  receiving  that  dividend.- 12 -
Hence  the full  cost of the investment  is $800  +  $386  - $1186  > $1100. As a
result,  we should  wait  and  keep our  option  alive,  rather  than  invest  today.
We have thus  come  to the  same  conclusion  as  we did  by comparing  NPV's. This
time, however, we  calculated the value of  the option to invest, and
explicitly  took  it into  account  as one  of the  costs  of investing.
Our calculation  of the  value  of the  option  to invest  was  based  on the
construction  of a risk-free  portfolio,  which requires  that one can trade
(hold  a long or short  position  in)  widgets.  Of course,  we could  just as
well have constructed  our  portfolio  using some  other  asset,  or combination
of assets, the price of which is perfectly  correlated  with the price of
widgets.  But what if one cannot  trade widgets,  and there  are no other
assets  that  nspan"  the risk in a widget's  price?  In this case one could
still  calculate  the  value of the option  to invest  the way we did at the
outset  - by computing  the NPV for each investment  strategy  (invest  today
versus wait a year and invest  if the price goes up), and picking the
strategy  that yields the highest  NPV.  That is essentially  the dynamic
programming  approach.  In this case it gives exactly the same answer,
because  all  price  risk  is diversifiable.  In Section  3  we will  explore  this
connection  between  option  pricing  and  dynamic  programming  in  more  detail.
Changing  the  Parameters.
So far  we have fixed  the  direct  cost  cf the  investment,  I, at $800. We
can obtain further insight  by changing this number, as well as other
parameters,  and calculating  the effects on the value of the investment
opportunity  and on the investment  decision. For example,  by going  through
the  same  steps  as above,  it  is  easy  to see  that  the  short  position  needed  to
obtain  a risk-free  portfolio  depends  on I  as follows:
n - 16.5 - .01I- 13 -
The  current  value  of the  option  to  invest  is then  given  by:
Fo - 750 - .455I
The reader  can check that as long as I >  $642, Fo exceeds  the net
benefit  from investing today (rather than waiting), V0 - I - $1,100 - I.
Hence if I  >  $642,  one  should  wait rather  than  invest  today. However,  if I
- $642,  Fo - $458 - V0 - I,  so that one would  be  indifferent between
investing  today and waiting  until next year.  (This  can also be seen  by
comparing  the NPV of investing  today  with the NPV of waiting  until next
year.)  And if I <  $642,  one should  invest  today  rather  than wait.  The
reason is that in this case the lost revenue from waiting exceeds the
opportunity  cost of closing  off the option  of waiting and not investing
should  the price fall.  This is illustrated  in Figure  2, which shows  the
value  of the  option,  Fo,  and  the  net  payoff,  V0 - I,  both as functions  of I.
For I >  $642, Fo - 750 - .455I  > V0 - I, so the option should be kept alive.
However, if  I  <  $642,  750  - .455I <  V0 - 1, so  the option  should be
exercised,  and  hence  its  value  is  just  the  net  payoff,  Vo - I.
We can  also  determine  how the  value  of the  investment  option  depends  on
q, the probability  that the price  of widgets  will rise next year.  To do
this,  let  us once again  set  I - $800.  The  reader  can  verify  that  the  short
position  needed  to obtain  a risk-free  portfolio  is independent  of q, i.e.,
is n - 8.5.  The payment required  for the short  position,  however,  does
depend  on q, because the expected  capital  gain on a widget  depends  on q.
The expected  rate of  capital  gain is  EE(Pl)  - PO]/PO - q  - .5, so the
required payment per widget in the short position is .1 - (q - .5)  - .6 - q.
By following  the same steps  as above,  the  reader  can check  that  the  value
today  of the option  to invest  is Fo  - 773q. This can  also  be written  as a
function  of the current  value of the project,  V0. We have V0 - 100 +- 14 -
E (l00q  +  50)/(1.1)t  - 600 + lOOOq,  so Fo - .773VO - 464.  Finally, note
that it is better  to wait  rather  than  invest  today  as long  as Fo  > VO - I,
or  q < .88.
There is nothing special  about the particular  source  of uncertainty
that  we introduced  in  this  problem. There  will  be a  value  to  waiting  (i.e.,
an opportunity  cost to investing  today  rather  than  waiting  for information
to arrive)  whenever  the investment  is irreversible  and the  net  payoff  from
the  investment  evolves stochastically  over time.  Thus we  could have
constructed  our  example  so that  the  uncertainty  arises  over future  exchange
rates,  factor  input  costs,  or government  policy.  For example,  the  payoff
from  investing, V,  might  rise  or  fall  in  the  future depending on
(unpredictable)  changes in  policy.  Alternatively,  the  cost  of  the
investment,  I, might rise or fall, in response  to changes in materials
costs,  or to a policy  change,  such as the granting  or taking  away of an
investment  subsidy  or tax  benefit.
In our example,  we made the unrealistic  assumption  that there is no
longer  any uncertainty  after the second  period.  Instead,  we could  have
allowed the price to change  unpredictably  each perioA.  For example,  we
could  posit that at t  - 2, if the  price  is $150,  it could  increase  to $225
with'probability  q or fall to $75  with probability  (l-q),  and if it is $50
it could  rise  to $75  or fall  to $25.  Price  could  rise  or fall  in  a similar
way at t - 3, 4, etc.  One could  then  work out  the  value  of the  option  to
invest, and the optimal rule for exercising  that option.  Although  the
algebra  is messier,  the method  is essentially  the same as for the simple
two-period  exercise  we carried  out  above. 7 Rather  than  take  this  approach,
7This  is the  basis  for  the  binomial  option  pricing  model. See  Cox  and
Rubinstein  (1985)  for  a  detailed  discussion.- 15 -
in th.t  next section  we extend  our  example  by allowing  the  payoff  from the
investment  to fluctuate  continuously  over  time.
3.  A More  General  Problem  of Investment  Timing.
One of the more basic models of irreversible  investment  is that of
McDonald  and Siegel (1986).  They considered  the following  problem:  At
what point  is it optimal  to  pay a sunk  cost  I in return  for  a  project  whose
value  is  V, given  that  V evolves  according  to:
dV/V - uidt  +  adz  (1)
where  dz is the increment  of a Wiener  process. 8 Eqn. (1)  implies  that  the
current  value of the project is known,  but future  values  are lognormally
distributed  with a variance  that  grows  linearly  with the  time  horizon. And
although  information  arrives  over time (the  firm observes  V caanging),  the
future  value  of the  project  is  always  uncertain. 9
8  ~~~~~~1/2 8That is, dz - e(t)(dt)  ,  with e(t) a  serially  uncorrelated  and
normally  distributed  random  variable.  I will assume  that the reader  is
familiar  with continuous-time  stochastic  processes,  the  use  of Ito's  Lemma,
and  stochastic  dynamic  programming. For an introduction  to these  methods,
see  Merton (1971),  the  Appendix  to Fischer  (1975),  or Malliaris  and  Brock
(1982).
1 9This  process  for  V can  be  viewed  as  a special  case  of the  more  general
mean-reverting  process:
dV/V  - [a  +  A(V  -V)]dt  +  adz  (i)
where V* is a mean or "normal"  value to which  V  tends  to revert,  and A
measures  the speed of this reversion.  (Eqn. (i) is the continuous-time
version of a  first-order  autoregressive  process.)  If A - 0, then (i)
becomes  eqn. (1),  i.e.,  V is a rando?.  walk.  At the  opposite  extreme,  as A
is made very large,  V approaches  V  plus a serially  uncorrelated  error,
i.e.,  shocks  to V this  period  have no effect  on next period's  V.  We will
focus on the random  walk version  of eqn. (1) because  it is analytically
convenient,  and because it makes it easier  to understand  the effects  of
uncertainty.- 16 -
McDonald and Siegel  pointed out that the investment  opportunitl  is
equivalent  to a perpetual call option,  and deciding  when to invest is
equivalent to  deciding  when  to  exercise such an  option.  Thus,  the
investment  decision  can  be viewed  as a problem  of option  valuation  (as  we
saw in the simple  example  presented  in the  previous  section). I will re-
derive  the  solution  to  their  problem  in  two  ways,  first  using  option  pricing
(contingent  claims)  methods,  and then  via dynamic  programming. This will
allow us to compare these two approaches  and the assumptions  that each
requires. We will then  examine  the  characteristics  Af  the  solution.
Ontion  Pricing  Approach.
As we have  seen,  the  firm's  option  to invest,  i.e.,  its  option  to  pay I
ard receive  a project  worth  V, is analogous  to a call  option  on a stock.
Unlike  most financial  call options,  it is a perpetual  option  --  it  has no
expiration  date.  We  can value this option and determine the optimal
exercise  (investment)  rule using the same methods  that are used to value
financial  options. 10 To do this  we  need to  make  one  important  assumption.
We must assume that changes in V  are spanned  by existing  assets.
Specifically,  it must be possible  to find  an asset  or construct  a dynamic
portfolio  of assets  the price of which is perfectly  correlated  with V.11
This'is  equivalent'to  saying  that  markets  are  sufficiently  complete  that  the
firm's  decisions  do not affect  the  opportunity  set available  to investors.
The assumption  of spanning  should  hold for most commodities,  which are
typically  traded  on both spot and futures  markets,  and for manufactured
lOFor  an overview  of contingent  claims  methods  and their  application,
see  Cox  and  Rubinstein  (1985)  and  Mason  and  Merton  (1985).
lNote  that a dynamic  portfolio  is a portfolio  whose holdings  are
adjusted  continuously  as asset  prices  change.- 17 -
goods  to the  extent  that  prices  are  correlated  with the  values  of shares  or
portfolios.  However,  in some cases this assumption  will not hold, for
example,  a new  product  unrelated  to any  existing  ones.
With the  spanning  assumption,  we can  determine  the  investment  rule that
maximizes  the firm's  market  value  without  making  any  assumptions  about  risk
preferences  or discount  rates,  and  the  investment  problem  reduces  to one  of
contingent  claim  valuation. (We  will see  shortly  that  if spanning  does  not
hold,  dynamic  programming  can  still  be used  to  maximize  the  present  value  of
the  firm's  expected  flow  of  profits,  subject  to  an arbitrary  discount  rate.)
Let x  be  the price of an asset or portfolio  of assets  perfectly
correlated  with V, and denote  by pVm  the correlation  of V with the  market
portfolio. Then  x evolves  according  to:
dx - pxdt +  axdz,
and  by the  CAPM,  its  expected  return  is  p  - r  +  Pvm°e where  0  is  the  market
price  of risk. We can  assume  that  a, the  expected  percentage  rate  of  change
of V, is  less  than  its  risk-adjusted  return  p, because  as  will  become  clear,
if this  were  not the  case,  the  firm  would  never  invest. No  matter  what the
current  level  of V, the firm  would  always  be better  off  waiting  and simply
holding  on to the  option  to  invest. We denote  by 6 the  difference  between  p
and 6, i.e., 6  - p - a.
A few words  about the  meaning  of 6  are in order,  given  the important
role it plays in this  model.  The analogy  with a financial  call  option  is
helpful  here.  If V were the  price  of a share  of common  stock,  6  would  be
the dividend  rate on the stock.  The total  expected  return  on the stock
would be p - 6  +  a, i.e.  ,  the dividend  rate plus the expected  rate of
capital  gain.- 18  -
If the dividend  rate 6 were zero, a call option  on the stock  would
always  be held to  maturity,  and  never  exercised  prematurely. The  reason  is
that  the  entire  return  on the  stock  is capturad  in its  price  movements,  and
hence  by the  call option,  so there  is no cost  to keeping  the  option  alive.
But if the dividend rate is positive,  there is an opportunity  cost to
keeping  the  option  alive  rather  zhan  exercising  it.  That  opportunity  cost
is the dividend  stream  that one foregos  by holding  the option  rather  than
the  stock. Since  6  is  a  proportional  dividend  rate,  the  higher  the  price  of
the stock,  the greal.er  the flow  of dividends. At some  high enough  price,
the opportunity  cost of foregone  dividends  becomes  high enough  to make it
worthwhile  to  exercise  the  optior.
For our investment  problem,  p  is the expected  rate of return from
owning  the  completed  project. It is the  equilibrium  rate  established  by the
capital  market,  and includes  an appropriate  risk premium.  If 6  >  0, the
expected  rate of capital  gain  on the  project  is less  than  p.  Hence  S  is  an
oRportunitv  cost of delaving construction  of  the project. and instead
keepaing  the ontion  to invest  alive.  If 6 were zero, there  would be no
opportunity  cost  to  keeping  the  option  alive,  and  one  would  never  invest,  no
matter  how high the NPV of the  project.  That is why we assume  6  > 0.  On
the bther  hand, if 6  is very large,  the value  of the  option  will be very
small,  because the oppertunity  cost of waiting is large.  As 6 -s  -,  the
value  of the  option  goes  to zero;  in  effect,  the  only  choices  are  to invest
now  or  never,  and  the  standard  NPV rule  will  again  apply.
The parameter  6  can  be interpreted  in  different  ways.  For  example,  it
could  reflect  the process  of entry  and capacity  expansion  by competitors.
Or it  can  simply  reflect  the  cash  flows  from  the  project. If the  project  is
infinitely  lived,  then  eqn. (1)  can  represent  the  evolution  of V during  the- 19  -
operation  of the  project,  and SV is the  rate  of cash flow  that  the  project
yields. Since  we assume  6  is constant,  this  is consistent  with future  cash
flows  being  a constant  proportion  of the  project's  market  value. 12
Eqn. (1)  is,  of course,  is  an abstraction  from  most real  projects. For
example,  if variable  cost is positive  and the project  can be shut down
temporarily  when price falls below variable  cost, V will not follow a
lognormal  process,  even  if the  output  price  does.  Nonetheless,  eqn. (1)  is
a  usei4l simplification  that will help to clarify the main effects of
irreversibility  and uncertainty.  We will discuss  more complicated  (and
hopefully  more  realistic)  models  later.
Solvinz  the  Investment  Problem.
Let  us now turn  to the  valuation  of our  investment  opportunity,  and  the
optimal  investment  rule.  Let  F - F(V)  be the  value  of the  firm's  option  to
invest.  To find F(V) and the optimal  investment  rule, we consider  the
following  hedge  portfolio:  long  the  option  worth  F(V),  and  short  dF/dV  units
of the project (or equivalently,  of the asset or portfolio  x).  Using
subscripts  to denote  derivatives,  the value of this portfolio  is P - F-
FVV.
The short  position  in this portfolio  will require  a payment  of 6VFV
dollars  per time  period;  otherwise  no rational  investor  will  enter  into  the
12A  constant  payout  rate,  6,  and  required  return,  p, imply  an infinite
project  life. Letting  CF  denote  the  cash  flow  from  the  project:
V0 - T  CFte  Ptdt  - T  6V  e(A 6)teIptdt
which  implies  T - e.  If the  project  has  a finite  life,  then  eq.  (1)  cannot
represent  the evolution  of V during  the  operating  period. However,  it can
represent  its evolution  prior  to construction  of the project,  which  is all
that  matters  for  the  investment  decisions. See  Majd and  Pindyck  (1987),  pp.
11 - 13,  for  a detailed  discussion  of this  point.- 20  -
long  side of  the  transaction.  Taking this  into account, the  total
instantaneous  return  from  holding  the  portfolio  is:
dF - FVdV - SVFVdt
We  will  see  that this return is risk-free,  and  therefore  must equal
r(F-FvV)dt:
dF - FVdV - 6VFVdt  - r(F-FvV)dt  (2)
To obtain  an expression  for  dF,  use  Ito's  Lemma:
dF  - FVdV  +  (1/2)FwV(dV) 2 (3)
(Higher  order  terms  go to zero.) Substitute  (1)  for  dV,  with  a  - p - 6,  and
(dV)'  - o'V'dt  into  eqn. (3):
dF - (4-S)VFVdt  +  aVFVdz +  (1/21o2 V 2 FwVdt  (4)
Now substitute  (4)  into  (2),  rearrange  terms,  and note  that  all  terms  in  dz
cancel  out,  so the  portfolio  is indeed  risk-free:
(1/2)oa 2V 2Fw  +  (r-6)VFV - rF - 0  (5)
Eqn. (5) is a  differential  equation  that F(V) must satisfy.  In
addition,  F(V)  must  satisfy  the  following  boundary  conditions:
F(0) - 0  (6a)
*  *
F(V)}  V  - I  (6b)
FV(V  )  - 1  (6c)
Condition (6a) says that if V  goes to zero, it will stay at zero (an
implication  of the process (1)),  so the option to invest  will be of no
value. V  is the  price  at  which  it is  optimal  to invest,  and (6b)  just  says
that  upon investing,  the firm  receives  a  net payoff  V* - I.  Condition  (6c)
is called  the "smooth  pasting"  or "high  contact"  condition. If F(V)  were
not continuous  and smooth  at the critical  exercise  point  V*, one could  do
better  by exercising  at  a different  point. 13
'3Dixit  (1988)  provides  a  nice  heuristic  explanation  of this  condition.- 21 -
To find  F(V),  we must solve  eqn.  (5)  subject  to the  boundary  conditions
(6a-c).  In this case we can guess a functional  form, and determine  by
substitution  if it  works.  It is easy  to see that  the  solution  to eqn.  (5)
which  also  satisfies  condition  (6a)  is:
F(V) - aVi  (7)
where  a is  a constant,  and  0  is  given  by: 14
p  - 1/2 - (r 6)/02 +  ([(r-6)/0 2 _  1/2)2  +  2r/o2)1/2 (8)
The remaining  boundary  conditions,  (6b)  and (6c),  can  be used to solve
for  the  two  remaining  unknowns:  the  constant  a,  and the  critical  value  V* at
which it is optimal  to invest. By substituting  (7)  into (6b)  and (6c),  it
is  easy  to see  that:
*-  pI/(P-l)  (9)
and  a - (V*  - I)/(V*)P  (10)
Eqns.  (7) - (10)  give the  value  of the  investment  opportunity,  and  the
optimal  investment  rule,  i.e.,  the  critical  value  V  at which  it is  optimal
(in the sense of maximizing  the firm's  market  value) to invest.  We will
examine  the  characteristic  of this  solution  below. Here  we simply  point  out
that we  obtained this solution by  showing that a  'nedged  (risk-free)
portfolio  could be constructed  consisting  of the option  to invest  and a
short  position  in the project. However,  F(V)  must  be the  solution  to eqn.
(5)  even if the option  to invest  (or  the  project)  does  not exist  and  could
14The  general  solution  to  eqn. (5)  is
F(V)  - alVpl +  a2V2  ,
where  p 1 - 1/2 - (r-6)/a2  +  ([(r-6)/a2  1/2) +  2r/a2)1/ 2 >  1
and  i2 - 1/2  (r-6)/a2  ([(r-6)/a2  1/2)2 +  2r/a2)1/2 <  0.
Boundary  condition  (6a)  implies  that  a2 - 0, so the  solution  can  be written
as in eqn. (7).- 22 -
not be included  in the  hedge  portfolio. All that  is required  is spanning,
i.e.,  that  one could  find  or construct  an asset  or  portfolio  of assets  (x)
that replicates  the stochastic  dynamics  of V.  As Merton  (1977)  has shown,
one  can  replicate  the  value  function  with  a  portfolio  consisting  only  of the
asset  x and  risk-free  bonds,  and  since  the  value  of this  portfolio  will  have
the same dynamics  as F(V), the solution  to (5), F(V) must be the value
function  to  avoid  dominance.
As discussed  earlier,  spanning  will not always  hold.  If that is the
case,  one can  still  solve  the  investment  problem  using  dynamic  programming,
as is  shown  below.
Dynamic  Programmiing.
To  solve  the  problem  by  dynamic  programming,  note  that  we  want  a  rule
that  maximizes  the  value  of  our  investment  opportunity,  F(V):
F(V)  - max  Ett(VT  - I)eATJ  (11)
where Et denotes  the  expectation  at time  t, T is the (unknown)  future  time
that  the  investment  is  made,  p is  the  discount  rate,  and  the  maximization  is
subject  to  eqn. (1)  for  V.  We will  assume  that  j  > a, and  denote  6  - p - a.
Since  the  investment  opportunity,  F(V),  yields  no cash  flows  up to the
time  T that  the  investment  is  undertaken,  the  only  return  from  holding  it is
its 'capital  appreciation. Hence  the Bellman  equation  for this  problem  is
simply:
pF  - (l/dt)EtdF  (12)
Eqn. (12)  just says that the total  instantaneous  return  on the investment
opportunity,  #F, is  equal  to its  expected  rate  of  capital  appreciation.
Now  expand  dF  using  Ito's  Lemma,  as in  eqn. (3),  and  substitute  (1)  for
dV and (dV) 2:
dF - aVFVdt  + oVFVdz  + (1/2)a 2V2FVVdt23  -
Since Et(dz)  - 0, (1/dt)EtdF  - *VFv +  (l/2)o 2V2FwV,  and eqn. (12)  can be
rewritten  as:
(1/2)o2V2Fw  +  aVFV - F - 0
or,  substituting  a  - p - S,
(1/2)o2V2Fw +  (p-6)VFv  - pF  - 0  (13)
Observe  that this equation  is almost  identical  to eqn. (5);  the  only
difference  is that the discount  rate  p replaces  the  risk-free  rate  r.  The
boundary  conditions  (6a)  - (6c)  also  apply  here,  and  for  the  same  reasons  as
before.  (Note  that (6c)  follows  from  the  fact  that  V* is  chosen  to  maximize
the net payoff  V  - I.)  Hence the contingent  claims solution  to our
i.nvestment  problem  is  equivalent  to  a  dynamic  programming  solution,  under
the  assumption  of risk  neutrality. 15
Thus if spanning  does not  hold,  we can  still  obtain  a solution  to the
investment  problem, subject to some discount rate.  The solution  will
clearly  be of the same form,  and the effects  of changes  in a or 6 will
likewise  be  the same.  One point is worth noting, however.  Without
spanning,  there is no theory  for determining  the "correct"  value for the
discount  rate p.  The CAPM,  for example,  would  not hold either,  and so it
could  not  be used  to calculate  a risk-adjusted  discount  rate.
15This result  was first  demonstrated  by Cox and  Ross (1976). Also,
note that  eqn. (5)  is the  Bellman  equation  for  the  maximization  of the  net
payoff  to the  hedge  portfolio  that  we constructed. Since  the  portfolio  is
risk-free,  the  Bellman  equation  for  that  problem  is:
rP  - - SVPv  +  (l/dt)EtdP  (i)
i.e.,  the  return  on the  portfolio,  rP, equals  the  per  period  cash  flow  that
it pays out (which  is  negative,  since  6VFv  must  be paid in to  maintain  the
short  position),  plus the  expected  rate  of capital  gain.  By  substituting  P
- F  - FVV  and  expanding  dF  as  before,  one  can  see  that  (5)  follows  from  (i).- 24 -
Characteristics  of the  Solution.
A few  numerical  solutions  will  help to illustrate  the  results  and  show
how they depend  on the  values  of the  various  parameters. As we will see,
these  results  are  largely  the  same  as those  that  come  out  of standard  option
pricing  models. Unless  otherwise  noted,  in  what  follows  we set  r  - .04,  5  -
.04,  and  the  cost  of the  investment,  J, equal  to 1.
Figure  3 shows  the  value of the firm's  investment  opportunity,  F(V),
for a  - 0.2 and 0.3.  (These  values  are probably  conservative  for most
projects;  in  volatile  markets,  the  standard  deviation  of annual  changes  in  a
project's  value  can  easily  exceed  20 or 30 percent.) The  tangency  point  of
F(V)  with the  line  V - I gives  the  critical  value  of V,  V*; the  firm  should
invest  only if V >  V . For  any  positive  a,  V  > I.  Thus the  standard  NPV
rule,  "Invest  when the  value  of a  project  is  at least  as great  as its  cost,"
is incorrect;  it ignores  the  opportunity  cost  of investing  now rather  than
waiting  for nwew  information. That opportunity  cost is  exactly  F(V).  When
V < V*, V <  I +  F(V),  i.e.,  the  value  of the  project  is  less than  its  =fll
cost,  the  direct cost I  plus the  opportunity  cost of  "killing" the
investment  option.
Note  that  F(V)  increases  when  a increases,  and  so too  does  the  critical
valu6 V*.  Thus uncertainty  increases  the value of a firm's investment
opportunities,  but decreases  the amount  of actual  investing  that the firm
will do.  As a result,  when  a firm's  market  or economic  environment  becomes
more  uncertain,  the  market  value  of the  firm  can  go  up,  even  though  the  firm
does  less  investing  and  perhaps  produces  lessl This  also  makes  it easier  to
understand  why as oil prices  fell during  the  mid-1980's  but at the same
time the perceived  uncertainty  over future  oil prices  rose,  oil companies- 25 -
paid more tnan ever for offshore  leases  and other  oil-bearing  lands,  even
though  their  development  expenditures  fell  and  they  produced  less.
Finally,  note that  this  effect  of uncertainty  involves  no assumptions
about  risk  preferences,  or about  the extent  to  which  the  riskiness  of V is
correlatod  with the market.  Firms can be risk-neutral,  and stochastic
changes  in V can  be completely  diversifiable;  an increase  in a will still
increase  V  and  hence  tend  to depress  investment.
* Figures 4 and 5 show how F(V) and V  depend  on 6.  Note that an
increase  in 6 from .04  to  .08  results  in a decrease  in F(V),  and hence  a
decrease  in  the  critical  value  V*.  (In  the  limit  as  6  -.  c,  F(V)  - 0 for  V <
I, and  V*  - I, as Figure  5 shows.) The  reason  is  that  as 6  becomes  larger,
the  expected  rate  of growth  of V falls,  and  hence  the  expected  appreciati.n
in the  value of the option  to invest  and acquire  V falls.  In effect,  it
becomes  costlier  to wait  rather  than invest  now.  To see  this,  consider  the
example  of an investment  in an apartment  building,  where 6V represents  the
net flow of rental  income. The total  return  on the  building,  which must
equal  the  risk-adjusted  market  rate,  has two components  - this  income  flow
plus the expected  rate of capital  gain.  Hence the greater  is the income
flow  relative  to the total  return  on the  building,  the  more one  forgoes  by
holding  an  option  to invest  in the  building,  rather  than  owning  the  building
itself.
If  the  risk-free  rate,  r, is increased,  F(V)  increases,  and  so does  V .
The  reason  is  that the  present  value  of an investment  expenditure  I made  at
a future  time T is Ie  rT, but the present  value of the project  that  one
receives  in return  for that  expenditure  is VsT  Hence  with S  fixed,  an
increase  in r reduces  the present  value  of the  cost of the investment  but
does  not  reduce  its  payoff. But  note  that  while  an increase  in r raises  the- 26 -
value of a firm's investment  options,  it also results  in fewer  of those
options being  exercised.  Hence higher  (real) interest rates reduce
investment,  but for  a different  reason  than  in  the  standard  model.
4.  A Simple  Extension.
As  explained earlier, eqn. (1) is an  abstraction  from most real
projects.  A more realistic  model  would treat  the prLia of the project's
output  as a geometric  random  walk (and  possibly  cae or more factor  input
costs  as  well),  rather  than  the  value  of the  project. In addition,  it  would
also  account  for  the fact  that  the  project  can  be shut  down (permanently  or
temporarily)  if  price  falls  below  variable  cost.
The  model  developed  in the  previous  section  can easily  be extended  in
this  way.  Specifically,  we will assume  that  the output  price,  P, follows
the  stochastic  process:
dP/P  - adt  +  odz  (14)
where a  <  p, the market risk-adjusted  rate on P or an asset perfectly
correlated  with  P,  and  6  - p - a  as  before. If  the  output  of the  project  is
a storable  commodity  (e.g.,  oil or copper),  6  will represent  the  marginal
net  rate  of convenience  yield  from  storage,  i.e.,  the  flow  of  benefits  (less
storAge costs) that the marginal  stored  unit provides.  Note that for
simplicity  we are assuming  that  S  is constant;  for most commodities,  the
marginal  convenience  yield fluctuates  over time as the total amount of
storage  fluctuates.
We  will  assume  for  simplicity  that  marginal  and  average  production  cost
is equal  to a constant,  c, and  that  the  project  can  be costlessly  shut  down
if P falls  below c, and later  restarted  if P rises  above  c.  The project27 -
produces  one unit of output  per period,  and the cost of investing  in the
project  is I.  We will  also  assume  that  the  project  is infinitely  lived.
We now have two  problems  to solve.  First,  we must find the  value  of
this project,  V(P).  Note that the project  represents  a set of options
(which  we will call  operating  options). Specifically,  once  the  project  has
been built,  the firm has, for each future  time t, an option  to produce  a
unit of output,  i.e.,  an option  to pay  c and  receive  P.  Hence  the  project
is equivalent  to a  large number (in this case, infinite,  because the
project  is assumed  to last indefinitely)  of operating  options,  and can  be
valued  accordingly. 16
Second,  given  the  value  of the  project,  we must  value  the  firm's  option
to invest  in this  project,  and determine  the  optimal  exercise  (investment)
rule.  This  will  boil down  to finding  a critical  P  , where  the  firm  invests
only if P > P*.  Below,  we show  how the two  steps  to this  problem  can be
solved  sequentially. 17
Valuing  the  Project.
If  we assume  that  uncertainty  over  P is spanned  by existing  assets,  we
can value the project (and the option to invest in the project)  using
16This point is discussed  in detail  in McDonald  and Siegel (1985).
Brenian  and Schwartz  (1985)  developed  a model  similar  to this  for  a mining
project,  but is more general  in that it allows  for costs  of shutting  down
and  starting  back  up.  In  a related  paper,  Dixit  (1989)  developed  a  model  of
costly  entry  and  exit in  which  a firm  can  decide  to  become  inactive,  but if
it later  wants to produce,  it must again  incur  an entry  cost.  Hence  the
firm  will  produce  when  price  is  below  variable  cost. In the  model  presented
below,  the  firm  can costlessly  stop  and  restart  production,  and  only  pays  a
one-time  investment  cost  when it  enters  the  market.
17Note that  the  option  to invest  is an option  to purchase  a package  of
call options (because  the project  is just a set of options  to pay c and
receive  P at qach future  time t).  Hence  we are  valuing  a compound  option.
For examples  of compound  financial  option  valuation,  see Geske (1979)  and
Carr (1988). Our  problem  can  be treated  in  a simpler  manner.- 28 -
contingent  claim  methods. Otherwise,  we can  specify  a discount  rate  and  use
dynamic  programming.  We will  assume  spanning  and  use  the  first  approach.
As before, we construct  a risk-free  portfolio:  long the project  and
short Vp units of the output.  This portfolio  has value  V(P) - VpP, and
yields  the instantaneous  cash flow  j(P-c)dt  - SVpPdt,  where  j  - 1 if P  > c
so that  the firm is  producing,  and  j  - 0 otherwise. (Recall  that  SVpPdt  is
the  payment that  must be made to maintain  the short  position.) The total
return  on the portfolio  is thus  dV - VpdP  + j(P-c)dt  - SVpPdt. Since  this
return  is risk-free,  set  it  equal  to r(V  - VpP)dt. Expanding  dV using  Ito's
Lemma, substituting  (14) for dP, and rearranging  yields the following
differential  equation  for  V:
(1/2)o 2P2Vpp  + (r-6)PVp  - rV +  j(P-c)  - 0  (15)
This  equation must  be  solved subject to  the  following boundary
conditions:
V(O)  0  (16a)
V(c-)  - V(c+)  (16b)
tJ(c )-  Vp(c+)  (16c)
lim  V - P/6  - c/r  (16d)
P-
Condition  (16a)  is an implication  of eqn. (14),  i.e.,  if P is ever  zero  it
will stay  at zero,  so the  project  will then  have no  value. Condition  (16d)
says  that  as P  becomes  very  large,  the  probability  that  over  any  finite  time
period  it  will fall  below  cost  and  production  will  cease  becomes  very small.
Hence the value of  the project approaches  the difference  between two
perpetuities:  a flow  of revenue  (P)  that  is  discounted  at the  risk-adjusted
rate p but is expected  to grow rate a, and a flow of cost (c),  which is
constant  and  certain  and  hence  is  discounted  at rate  r.  Finally,  conditions- 29 -
(16b)  and (16c)  say  that  the  value  of the  project  is a continuous  and  smooth
function  of P.
The solution  to eqn. (15)  will  have two  parts,  one for  P <  c, and  one
for P  >  c.  The reader can check by  substitution  that the following
satisfies  (15)  as  well  as  boundary  conditions  (16a)  and (16d):
V(P) - (17)
A2Pp2  +  P/6 - c/r  ;  P  >  c
where:18  1 - 1/2 - (r-6)/v2  +  ([(r-6)/o2 - 1/2)2 +  2r/a2)1/2
2  2  2212 and  P 2 - 1/2 - (r-6)/o  _  ([(r-6)/o _  1/2)  +  2r/o 2 a1  2.
The constants  A1 and  A2 can  be found  by applying  boundary  conditions  (16b)
and (16c):
r - fP2 (r-6)  (1
A1- r6(P1-P 2) c
r - Pl(r-6)  (1-
A2 - rS(P 1-P2) c
The solution  (17)  for  V(P) can  be interpreted  as follows. When  P-<  c,
the  project  is not  producing. Then,  A1PPl  is the  value  of the  firm's  option
to produce  in the  future,  if and  when P increases.  When P  > c, the  project
is  producing. If,  irrespective  of changes  in  P, the  firm  had  no choice  but
to  continue  producing  throughout  the  future,  the  present  value  of the  future
flow of profits  would  be given  by P/6 - c/r.  However,  should  P fall,  the
18By substituting  (17)  for  V(P)  into  (15),  the  reader  can  check  that  P1
and  P 2 are  the  solutions  to  the  following  quadratic  equation:
(1/2)a p 1 (0 1-l) +  (r-S)pl - r - 0
Since  V(O) - 0, the  positive  solution  (p 1 > 1) must apply  when P <  c, and
the negative  solution  (P 2 <  0)  must apply  when P > c.  Note  that  P 1 is the
same  as g in  eqn. (8).- 30 -
firm  can stop producing  and avoid  losses. The  value  of its  option  to stop
producing  is  A2Pp2.
A numerical  example  will help to illustrate  this solution.  Unless
otherwise  noted,  we set  r - .04,  8 - .04,  and  c - 10.  Figure  6 shows  V(P)
for  a - 0, .2,  and .4.  (Again,  this  is a conservative  range  of values  for
a.  For  many  commodities,  the  standard  deviation  of annual  price  changes  is
in excess  of 40 percent.) Note that  when a - 0, there  is ito  possibility
that P will rise in the  future,  so the  firm  will never  produce  (and  has no
value) unless P >  10.  If P >  10, V(P) - (P - 10)/.04 - 25P - 250.  However,
if a  >  0, the  firm  always  has some  value  as long  as  P > 0; although  the  firm
may not be producing  today,  it is likely  to produce  at some point  in the
future.  Also, since the upside  potential  for future  profit  is unlimited
while  the  downside  is limited  to zero,  the  greater  is a, the  greater  is the
expected  future  flow  of  profit,  and  the  higher  is  V.
Figure  7 shows  V(P) for a - .2 and 6 - .02, .04,  and .08.  For  any
fixed risk-adjusted  discount rate, a  higher value of 6  means a  lower
expected  rate  of  price  appreciation,  and  hence  a lower  value  for  the  firm.
The  Investment  Decision.
Now  that  we have  determined  the  value  of this  project,  we must  find  the
optimal investment  rule.  Specifically,  what is the  value of the firm's
option  to invest  as a function  of the  price  P,  and  at  what  critical  price  P*
should  the  firm  exercise  that  option  by spending  an amount  I to  purchase  the
project?
By going  through  the  same  steps  as  above,  the  reader  can  check  that  the
value of the firm's  option to invest,  F(P), must satisfy  the following
differential  equation:
(l/2)o 2P2Fpp +  (r-6)PFp - rF - 0  (18)- 31 -
F(P)  must  also  satisfy  the  following  boundary  conditions:
F(0) - 0  (19a)
F(P*) - V(P ) - I  (19b)
Fp(P  )  - Vp(P  )  (19c)
These conditions  can be interpreted  in the same way as conditions  (6a)-
(6c) for the model presented  in Section  3.  The difference  is that the
payoff  from  the  investment,  V, is  now  a function  of the  price  P.
The  solution  to  eqn. (18)  and  boundary  condition  (19a)  is:
aP1  p  <  p*
F(P)  - 1  (20)
FP  V(P) - I  ,  P  *>  P
where P 1 is given  above  under  eqn. (17).  To find  the constant  a and the
critical price P  we  u:e  boundary conditions (19b) and  (19c).  By
substituting  eqn. (20) for F(P) and eqn. (17) for  V(P) (for  P >  c) into
(19b)  and (19c),  the  reader  can  check  that  the  constant  a is given  by:
^  -2  (p*P2-P)  +  1  (p*)(l-pl)  (21)
a  l  P 1 1  21
and  the  critical  price  P* is  the  solution  to:
______(p*  2 +  P p*  c  I  - 0  (22) P 1 (P08 1 r
.Eqn. (22), which  is easily solved numerically,  gives the optimal
investment  rule.  The reader  can check that (22) has a unique  positive
solution  for  e  that  is larger  than  c.  Hence  the  project  must  be more  than
profitable  before  it is  optimal  to invest  in it.  (The  reader  can  also  check
that  V(Pe)  > I, so that  the  project  must  have  an  NPV that  exceeds  zero
before  it  is  optimal  to  invest.)
This  solution  is  shown  graphically  in  Figure  8,  for  a  - .2,  6  - .04,
and  I - 100.  The figure  plots  F(P)  and  V(P)  - I.  Note  from  boundary- 32  -
condition  (19b)  that  P*  satisfies  F(P*)  - V(P*)  - I,  and  note  from  boundary
condition  (19c)  that  P  is  at a  point  of tangency  of the  two  curves.
The  comparative  statics  for  changes  in  a  or 6 are  interesting  here.  As
we say  before,  an increase  in a  results  in an increase  in V(P) for  any P.
(Remember  that the project  is essentially  a set  of call options  on future
production,  and the greater  the  volatility  of price,  the  greater  the  value
of these  options.) But although  an increase  in a raises  the  value  of the
project,  it also increases  the critical  price at which it is optimal  to
invest,  i.e.,  aP*/aa  >  0.  The reason  is that for  any P, the opportunity
cost of investing,  F(P),  increases  even more than  V(P).  Hence  as  with the
simpler model presented in the previous  section, increased  uncertainty
reduces  investment. This result  is illustrated  in Figure  9, which shows
F(P)  and  V(P) - I for  a  - 0, .2,  and .4. When  a - 0, the  critical  price  is
14,  which  just  makes  the  value  of the  project  equal  to its  cost  of 100. As
a  is increased,  both  V(P) and  F(P) increase;  P  is 23.8  for  a  - .2  and  34.9
for  a  - .4.
An increase  in  6  also  increases  the  critical  price  P  at  which  the  firm
should  invest.  There are two  opposing  effects  here.  If 6  is larger,  so
that the expected  rate of increase  of P  is smaller,  options  on future
production  are worth less, so V(P) is smaller.  At the same time, the
expected  rate of growth  of F(P) is smaller,  so there  is more incentive  to
exercise  the  investment  option,  rather  than  keep  it alive. The first  effect
outweighs  the second,  so that a higher  6  implies  a higher e.  This is
illustrated  in Figure  10,  which  shows  F(P)  and  V(P) - I for  6  - .04  and .08.
Note that  when 6 is increased,  V(P) and hence F(P) fall sharply,  and the
tangency  at P*  moves  to  the  right.- 33 -
This  result  might  at first  seem  to  contradict  what  the  simpler  model  of
Section  3 tells  us.  Recall  that  in  that  model,  an increase  in 6  reduces  the
critical  value  of the  Rroject,  V*, at which the firm should  invest.  But
although  in this model P* is higher  when 6 is larger,  the corresponding
value of the project,  V(P ),  is lower.  This can be seen from  Figure  11,
which  shows  P* as a function  of a for 6  - .04  and .08,  and  Figure  12,  which
shows  V(P ).  If,  say,  a is .2  and 6 is increased  from .04  to .08,  P* will
rise from 23.8 to 29.2,  but even at the  higher  P*,  V is lower. Thus  V-
V(P )  is declining  w'th 6,  just  as in  the  simpler  model.
This model,  although  still  unrealistic  in some respects,  gets at the
essence  of  how  uncertainty  over  future  prices  affects  the  value  of a  project
and the decision  to invest  in the project.  Furthermore,  the model has
practical  application,  especially  if the project is one that produces  a
traded commodity,  like copper or oil.  In that case, a  and 6 can be
determined  directly  from  futures  and  spot  market  data.  Also,  the  model  can
easily  be expanded  to allow for fixed  costs of temporarily  stopping  and
restarting  production,  if such  costs  are  important. 19
Alternative  Stochastic  Processes.
The model can also be adapted to allow for alternative  stochastic
processes  for the price,  P, although  in most cases  numerical  methods  will
then  be necessary  to obtain  a solution. For example,  for  some  commodities
there  may  be reason  to  believe  that  P follows  a mean-reverting  process,  such
as:
dP/P  - X(P  - P)dt  + odz  (23)
19See  Brennan  and  Schwartz  (1985)  for  a model  of a mining  project  that
does  just  this.- 34 -
Here, P tends  to revert  back to a "normal"  level  P.  (For  example,  P might
be long-run  marginal  cost in the  case of commodity  like  copper  or coffee.)
By going through  the same arguments  as we did before,  it is easy to show
that  in this  case  V(P)  must  satisfy  the  following  differential  equation:
(1/2)o  P  Vpp  +  [(r-p-A)P  +  A)PPVP  - rV  +  j(P-c)  - 0  (24)
with  boundary  conditions  (16a)  - (16d). The  value  of the  investment  option,
F(P),  must  satisfy:
(1/2)a2P2Fpp  +  [(r-p-A)P  +  AP]PFp  - rF  - 0  (25)
and boundary conditions (19a) - (19c).  Equations (24) and  (25) are
ordinary differential  equations,  and  solution by  numerical methods is
reasonably  straightforward.
5.  EuMirical  Evidence.
The models  discussed  above  are theoretical,  but have implications  for
investment  behavior. Most important,  they  suggest  that  investment  should  be
particulary  sensitive  to uncertainty  of various  forms,  more sensitive  than
standard  models  would  imply. It is interesting,  then,  that  most  econometric
models  of aggregate  economic  activity  ignore  the  role  of risk,  or  deal  with
it only implicitly.  A more explicit  treatment  of risk  may  help to better
explain  economic  fluctuations,  and  especially  investment  spending.
Consider  the recessions  of 1975 and 1980.  The sharp  jumps in energy
prices that occurred in 1974 and 1979-80 clearly contributed  to those
recessions. They caused  a reduction  in the real national  incomes  of oil
importing  countries,  and  they  led  to "adjustment  effects"  --  inflation  and  a
further  drop in real income  and output  resulting  from the  rigidities  that
prevented  wages  and  non-energy  prices  from  coming  into  equilibrium  quickly.
But  those  energy  shocks  also  caused  greater  uncertainty  over  future  economic- 35 -
conditions. For  example,  it  was  unclear  whether  energy  prices  would  fall  or
continue  to rise,  what the impact  of higher  energy  prices  would  be on the
marginal products  of  various types  of  capital, how  long-lived the
inflationary  impact  of the  shocks  would  be,  etc.  Other  events  also  made  the
economic environment  more  uncertain, especially in  1979-82:  much  more
volatile  exchange  rates  and interest  rates.  This may have contributed  to
the  decline  in investment  spending  that  occurred  during  these  periods. 20
Explaining  Investment  Behavior.
The explanation  of aggregate  and sectoral  investment  behavior  remains
problematic  in the  development  of macro-econometric  models. Existing  models
have had, at best, limited  success  in explaining  or predicting  investment.
The problem  is not simply  that  these  models  have been able to explain  and
predict  only a small  portion  of the  movements  in investment.  In addition,
constructed  quantities  that in theory  should  have strong  explanatory  power
--  e.g.  Tobin's  q, or  various  measures  of the  cost  of  capital  --  in  practice
do  not,  and  leave  much  of investment  spending  unexplained. 21
It is easy to think  of reasons  for the  failings  of these  models. If
nothing else,  there  are  formidable estimation problems arising from
aggregation  (across firms, and across investment  projects  of different
gestAtions). At issue is the importance  of their failure  to treat risk
properly.  Effects  of risk are typically  handled  by assuming  that a risk
premium (obtained,  say, from the  CAPM) can  be added  to the discount  rate
used to calculate  the present  value  of a project. But as we have learned
20This  point  was  made  by Bernanke  (1983),  particularly  with respect  to
changes in oil prices.  Also, see Evans (1984)  and Tatom (1984)  for a
discussion  of the  depressive  effects  of increased  interest  rate  volatility.
21See  Kopcke  (1985) for  an  overview, as  well  as  examples and
comparisons  of traditional  approaches  to  modelling  investment  spending.- 36 -
from financial  option  pricing  and its application  to real investment,  the
correct  discount  rate  cannot  be obtained  without  actually  solving  the  option
valuation  problem,  that  discount  rate  need  not  be constant  over  time,  and it
will  not  equal  the  firm's  average  cost  of capital. As a result,  simple  cost
of  capital  measures,  based  on rates  of return  (simple  or adjusted)  to  equity
and  debt,  may  be poor  explanators  of investment  spending.
This can be seen in the  contex:t  of models  based  on Tobin's  q.  A good
example  is the  model  of  Abel and  Blanchard  (1986),  which  is  one  of the  most
sophisticated  attempts  to explain  investment  in a q theory  framework; it
uses a carefully  constructed  measure  for marginal  rather  than average  q,
incorporates  delivery  lags and costs  of adjustment,  and explicitly  models
expectations  of future  values  of explanatory  variables.
The model is based  on the  standard  discounted  cash flow  rule,  "invest
in the marginal  unit of capital  if the present discounted  value of the
expected  flow of profits  resulting  from the  unit is at least  equal  to the
cost  of the  unit." Let  wt(Kt,It)  be the  maximum  value  of  profits  at time  t,
given  the  capital  stock  Kt and investment  level  It, i.e.  it is  the  value  of
profits  assuming  that  variable  factors  are  used  optimally. It  depends  on It
because  of costs  of adjustment; 8r/OI  < 0, and 82w/dI 2 <  0, i.e.  the  more
rapidly  new  capital  is  purchased  and  installed,  the  more  costly  it is.  Then
the  present  value  of  current  and  future  profits  is  given  by:
Vt E[  E  E[I  l+R  t+i  lt+j(Kt+jPI  )]
where Et denotes  an expectation,  and R is the discount  rate.  Maximizing
this  with  respect  to It.  subject  to the  condition  Kt  - (1- 1 6 Kt_l  + It (where
6 is the  rate  of depreciation),  gives  the  following  marginal  condition:- 37  -
*Et(amt/aIt)  -qt  (26)
where  qt  Et[Ei  (l+Rt+i)' (8irt+j/8Kt+j)(l-6)i]  (27)
In other words investment  occurs up to the point where the cost of an
additional  unit of capital  equals  the  present  value  of the  expected  flow  of
incremental  profits  resulting  from the unit.  Abel and Blanchard  estimate
both  linear  and  quadratic  approximations to  qt,  and  use  vector
autoregressive  representations  of Rt and axt/aKt  to model expectations  of
future  values. Their  representation  of Rt is based  on  a weighted  average
of the  rates  of  return  on equity  and  debt.
If the correct discount  rates Rt+i were known,  eqns.  (26) and (27)
would indeed  accurately  represent  the optimal  investment  decision  of the
firm.  The problem  is that these  discount  rates  are  usually  not  known,  and
generally  will not equal  the average  cost  of capital  of the firm,  or some
related  variable. Instead,  these  discount  rates  can only  be determined  as
part of  the solution to  the firm's optimal investment  problem.  This
involves valuing the  firm's options to  make  (irreversible)  marginal
investments  (now  or in the future),  and  determining  the  conditions  for  the
optimal  exercise  of those options.  Thus the solution  to the investment
problem  is  more  complicated  than  the  first-order  condition  given  by (26)  and
(27)  would  suggest.
As an example, consider  a project that has  zero systematic  (non-
diversifiable)  risk. The  use of a risk-free  interest  rate  for  R  would  lead
to much too large a value for qt, and might suggest  that an investment
expenditure  should  be made,  whereas  in fact  it should  be delayed. Further-
more,  there  ls  no simple  way to  adjust  R properly. The  problem  is that  the
calculation  ignores the opportunity  cost of  exercising the option to- 38 -
invest. This  may be why  Abel and  Blanchard  conclude  that "our  data  are  not
sympathetic  to the  basic  restrictions  imposed  by the  q theory,  even  extended
to  allow  for  simple  delivery  lags."
Does  Irreversibility  Matter?
Unfortunately,  incorporating  irreversibility  into  models  of aggregate
investment  spending  is  not a simple  matter. As we have seen,  the  equations
describing  optimal  investment  decisions  are extremely  nonlinear,  even for
very simple  models. Partly  as a result  of this,  there  has  been  very limited
empirical  work to date that  tests  the  importance  of irreversibility  for  the
modelling  of investment  spending.
One  paper  that  does  provide  such  a test  is  by Bizer  and  Sichel  (1988).
They  develop  a  model  of capital  accumulation  and  utilization  with  asymmetric
costs  of adjustment,  i.e.,  the costs  of adjusting  the  capital  stock  up or
down  can differ. If irreversibility  is important,  one  would  expect  to find
that  downward  adjustment  costs  exceed  upward  ones.  Bizer  and  Sichel  derive
an  Euler equation, which  they estimate using Hansen and  Singleton's
generalized  instrumental  variable  procedure.  They do  not  have firm  data,  so
instead  they use 2-digit SIC industry  data.  They measure asymmetry  of
adjustment  costs with respect to two reference  points: a zero level of
investment,  and  a "normal'  (average)  level  of investment.
Their  preliminary  results  indicate  some  evidence  of irreversibility,  in
particular  in primary  metals,  fabricated  metal  products,  and possibly  the
paper industry.  But they also find thet upward  adjustment  costs exceed
downward  ones in the food and petroleam  industries. This may simply  mean
that  aggregation  is  maskirg  irreversibility.  Other  problems  include  the  use
of a single  discount  factor (the S&P dividend/price  ratio,  which is very
volatile) and cost of capital for all industries.  Nonetheless,  their- 39  -
approach  seems  like  a promising  way to test for  effects  of irreversibility,
particularly  if used with disaggregated  data.  It  does not, however,
explicitly  deal  with  effects  of changes  in risk.
In a recent  working  paper (1986),  I performed  some very simple  non-
structural  tests for the importance  of risk.  I used data on the stock
market,  on tne grounds  that  when product  markets  become  more volatile,  we
would  expect  stock  prices  to  also  become  more  volatile,  so that  the  variance
of stock returns  will be larger. This  was indeed  the case,  for example,
during  the recessions  of 1975 and 1980,  and most dramatically  during  the
Great Depression. Thus the  variance  of aggregate  stock  returns  should  be
correlated  with  aggregate  product  market  uncertainty.
Stock returns  themselves  are  also a predictor  of aggregate  investment
spending.  My concern  was whether  the  variance  of stock  returns  also has
predictive  power with respect  to investment,  and whether  that predictive
power goes beyond that of stock returns themselves,  as well as other
variables  that  would  usually  appear  in an empirical  investment  equation. I
conducted  two related  exploratory  tests.  First,  I tested  and  was able  to
accept  the  hypothesis  that the  variance  of stock  returns  Granger-cause  the
real  growth  rate  of investment.  Specifically,  the  variance  of returns  is  a
strong predictor  *of investment  growth,  but  investment  growth  does not
predict  the  variance  of returns. 22
22To say that  X causes  Y,  " two conditions  should  be met.  First,  X
should  help to predict  Y, i.e.  in a regression  of  Y against  past  values  of
Y,  the addition of past values of X  as  independent  variables should
contribute significantly  to  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regression.
Second,  Y should  not help to predict  X.  (If  X helps to predict  Y  nd Y
btlps to predict  X, it is likely  that one or more other  variables  are in
fact  "causing"  both  X and  Y.)- 40 -
Second, I  ran a  set of simple regressions  of the growth rate of
investment  against  stock  returns,  the  variance  of stock  returns,  and  a set
of  additional explanatory  variables that usually appear in  empirical
investment  equations. In these  regressions,  I found  the  variance  of stock
returns to be an important  explanator  of the growth rate of investment
spending,  in  most  cases  the  most  significant  single  explanator.
Of course  these  tests  are  extremely  crude,  and  based  on aggregate  data
and what is probably a very imperfect  measure of risk.  (Even if the
variance  of stock  returns  is a good  proxy  for  the  volatility  of cash  flows,
it  does  not capture  the  "peso  problem,"  i.e.  ,  the  risk  associated  with  some
possible  future  catastrophic  event.) Nonetheless,  the  results  suggest  that
the explicit inclusion  of market risk measures  may help to improve  our
ability to  explain  and  predict  investment spending, and  that  the
development  of structural  models  that include  such measures  should  be an
important  research  priority.
6.  Policy  Implications  and  Future  Research.
Much of our discussion  has dealt with decision  rules for individual
firms. Now  we will  turn  our  attention  to  what  these  rules  might  imply  about
poliay  at the industry-wide  or economy-wide  level.  Most important  is the
fact that we would expect  investment  spending  on an aggregate  level  to  be
especially  sensitive  to  risk  in  various  forms:  uncertainties  over  the  future
product  prices and operating  costs that determine  cash flows,  uncertainty
over  future  interest  rates,  and  uncertainty  over  the  cost  and timing  of the
investment  itself. This  means  that  if a goal  of macroeconomic  policy  is to
stimulate  investment,  stability  and credibility  may be much more important
than  tax  incentives  or interest  rates. Put  another  way, if  uncertainty  over- 41 -
the  economic  environment  is  high,  tax  and  related  incentives  may  have to  be
very large  to  have any  significant  impact  on investment.
The role of interest  rates  and interest  rate stability  are especially
interesting  here.  In a recent  paper, Ingersoll  and Ross (1988)  examined
irreversible  investment decisions when  the  interest  rate  evolves
stochastically,  but future  cash flows are known  with certainty. As with
uncertainty  over future  cash flows,  this creates  an opportunity  cost of
investing,  so that the traditional  NPV rule  will accept  too  many projects.
Instead,  an investment  should  be made  only  when the  interest  rate  is  below  a
critical  rate, r^. which is lower than the internal  rate of return,  ro,
which makes the NPV zero.  Furthermore,  the difference  between  r  and ro
grows  as the  volatility  of interest  rates  grows.
Ingersoll  and  Ross also  show that for long-lived  projects,  a decrease
in expected interest  rates for all future periods need not accelerate
investment.  The reason is that such a change also lowers  the cost of
waiting,  and thus can have an ambiguous  effect on investment.  This is
another  example  of how the  level  of interest  rates  may  be of only  secondary
importance  as a determinant  of aggregate  investment  spending. Interest  rate
volatility  (as well as the volatility  of  other variables)  may be more
impoirtant.  Rough empirical  tests (such  as those  in my 1986 paper)  might
provide  some  evidence  on  whether  this  is  indeed  the  case.
The irreversibility  of investment  also helps to explain why trade
reforms  can turn  out to  be counterproductive,  with a liberalization  leading
to  a  decrease in aggregate investment.  As  Dornbusch (1987) and Van
Wijnbergen  (1985)  have  noted,  uncertainty  over  future  tariff  structures,  and
hence  over  future  factor  returns,  creates  an opportunity  cost  to committing
capital  to new physical  plant.  Foreign  exchange  and liquid  assets  held- 42 -
abroad  involve  no such commitment,  and  so may  be preferable  even  though  the
expected  rate of return  is lower. 23 Likewise,  it may  be difficult  to stem
or reverse  capital  flight  if there  is a perception  that  it may  become  more
difficult  to  take  capital  out  of the  country  than  to  bring  it in.
The  irreversibility  of  investment is also  likely to have policy
implications  for specific  industries. The energy  industry  is an example.
In that  industry,  an aspect  of stability  and  credibility  has to  do  with the
threat  of price  controls,  "windfall"  profit  taxes,  or related  policies  that
might be imposed  should  prices rise substarnially. Given that price is
evolving  stochastically,  how  should  investment  decisions  take  into  account  a
probability  that  price  may be capped  at some  level? 24 How  does the  threat
of a price  cap, or the threat  of outright  expropriation,  affect  investment
behavior,  and industry  capacity  and  production? This is  a problem  that is
amenable  to the  methodology  described  in this  paper,  and  might  be addressed
as a topic  of future  research.
A more fundamental  problem  of stability  is the volatility  of market
prices  themselves. For many raw commodities  (oil is an obvious  example),
price  volatility  rose substantially  in the early  1970's,  and has  been  high
23Van Wijnbergen  is incorrect,  however,  when he claims  (p. 369) that
"theie  is only  a gain  to be obtained  by deferring  commitment  if  uncertainty
decreases  over time  so that  information  can  be acquired  about  future  factor
returns  as time goes  by."  Van Wijnbergen  bases  his analysis  on the  models
of  Bernanke (1983) and Cukierman (1980), in which there is  indeed a
reduction  in uncertainty  over time.  But as we have seen from the  models
discussed in  Sections 3  and  4  of  this paper, there is no  need for
uncertainty  over future  conditions  to fall  over  time.  In those  models,  the
future  value of the project  or price of output  is always  uncertain,  but
there  is  nonetheless  an opportunity  cost  to  committing  resources.
24Dixit  (1988) has  addressed this problem, but  only  in  a  very
preliminary  way.  He develops  a  model  of investment  in  which  the  free  market
price  is stochastic,  but there  is a permanent  ceiling  on the  price  that  the
firm  can  charge.- 43 -
since.  Other things  equal,  we would expect  this to increase  the  value of
land  and  other  resources  needed  to  produce  the  commodity,  but  have  a
depressing  effect on construction  expenditures  and production  capacity.
This means that there  may be added  benefits  from policies  that stab'lize
prices.
Most studies  of the  gains  from  price  stabilization  focus  on adjustment
costs  and  the  curvature  of demand  and (static)  supply  curves. (See  Newbery
and Stiglitz  (1981)  for an overview.)  The irreversibility  of investment
creates  an additional  gain which  may be substantial. Krugman  (1988)  has
examined this  in  a  limited way  in  the  context of  exchange rate
stabilization.  He showed  how irreversibility  (i.e.,  sunk  costs)  will cause
firms to  remain  in markets even when they are losing  money because of
adverse exchange  rate movements,  and fail to enter markets even though
favorable  exchange  rate movements  would seem to make entry profitable.
Furthermore,  this  feeds  back  to exchange  rates  themselves,  and  adds  to their
volatility. In a similar  vein,  Caballero  and  Corbo (1988)  have shown  how
uncertainty  over  future  real  exchange  rates  can  depress  exports.
The  emerging  literature  on these  effects  of uncertainty  and  instability
has produced  models  that are fairly  simple  and almost  purely  theoretical.
While  it is  clear  that  increase  in  the  volatility  of,  say,  interest  rates  or
exchange  rates  should  depress  investment,  it is not at all  clear  bow  alrge
the effect  is likely  to be.  Nor is it clear  how important  these  factors
have  been  as explanators  of investment  across  countries  and  over  time.
Determining  the  importance  of these factors should be  a  research
priority. One approach  is to do empirical  testing  of the  sort  discussed  in
the preceding  section,  perhaps  using cross section  data for a  number of
countries.  Another approach is  to construct a  simulation  model, the- 44 -
structure  of which  might  be similar  to the  model  presented  in  Section  4, and
parameterize  it so that it "fits"  a particular  industry. One could then
calculate  predicted  effects  of observed  changes  in, say,  price  volatility,
and compare  them to the predicted  effects  of changes  in interest  rates  or
tax  rate.  Simulation  models  of this  sort could  likewise  be constructed  to
predict the effect  of a perceived  possible  shift in the tax regime,  the
imposition  of price  controls,  etc.  Such models  may also be a good way to
study  uncertainty  of the  "peso  problem"  sort.- 45 -
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